

THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER AND MANEUVER WARFARE: ARE THEY COMPATIBLE?

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major Rick W. Schmidt
United States Marine Corps**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff
College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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
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
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
Approved by:



COL Anthony Zell, MMAS Monograph Director



COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS Director, School of Advanced Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Director, Graduate Degree Program

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ABSTRACT

THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER AND
MANEUVER WARFARE: ARE THEY COMPATIBLE? by MAJ Rick W.
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Many airpower proponents in and outside the Air Force believe that airpower is the dominant force in warfare today. The Air Force believes that centrally controlled, independent air operations can be decisive. The JFACC coordinates all aviation assets in theater in support of the Joint Force Commander's theater objectives. The doctrinal development of the JFACC has been heavily influenced by the Air Force's perspectives and Service doctrine in regard to the employment of airpower.

With the publication of FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, in 1989, the Marine Corps officially embraced maneuver warfare as its doctrinal style of warfighting. The Marine Corps is organized to conduct maneuver warfare as an integrated air-ground combined arms team. Marine air is a critical part of the highly trained, tightly integrated combined arms team. The application of Marine air is timely and responsive to the fast developing ground battle and therefore, creates or exploits windows of opportunity that could quickly dissipate if air had to be coordinated from an outside agency.

This monograph will examine maneuver warfare theory, the Marine Corps embrace of it, and the doctrinal development and application of the JFACC in order to determine if the two doctrines are compatible.

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INTRODUCTION

Many airpower proponents in and outside the Air Force believe that airpower, properly employed, is the dominant form of war today. The Air Force believes that centrally controlled, independent air operations can be decisive. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) commands all aviation assets in theater in support of the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) theater objectives. In the joint arena, the doctrinal development of the JFACC has been heavily influenced by the Air Force's perspectives and doctrine in regard to the employment of air power.

Before and especially since Desert Storm, there has been an ongoing debate on the role of the JFACC and the integration of air power in the joint fight. Beyond the traditional concerns of availability of close air support for the Army and the Marine Air Ground Task Force's (MAGTF) control of its own aviation, are the central issues of execution and interdiction control and the weapons employed for that purpose. These weapons include not only fixed wing aviation but rotary wing and long range artillery and missile systems such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).¹

With the publication of FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, in 1989, the Marine Corps officially embraced maneuver warfare as its doctrinal style of warfighting. The Marine Corps is organized to conduct maneuver warfare as an integrated air-ground combined arms team. Marine air is a critical part of the tightly trained

combined arms team. Combined arms maneuver warfare requires commanders to stay inside the enemy's decision cycle. Commanders make rapid decisions based on their observations of the battlefield. The JFACC's Air Tasking Order (ATO) process is deliberate and not responsive to immediate requirements of surface commanders. The application of Marine air is timely and responsive to the fast developing ground battle and therefore, creates or exploits windows of opportunity that could quickly dissipate if air had to be coordinated from an outside agency. The JFACC interferes with the ground commander's ability to use airpower to affect tactical and operational battles before the enemy can react. The JFACC decides when and how aviation assets will support ground maneuver based on his perspective on the employment of airpower and his assigned mission. Additionally, it has often been stated by critics of MAGTF operations that all aviation is the same and that any aviation asset could be substituted into the finely tuned Marine combined arms team.² This kind of thinking demonstrates a lack of understanding, education and experience in combined arms and the art of maneuver warfare.

However, to say that the JFACC and Marine Corps doctrine are not compatible is, to a certain degree, unrealistic. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the JFACC and maneuver warfare at the operational and tactical levels to determine if, and to what degree, the two are compatible. This is important for two reasons. Foremost, in addition to the Marine Corps embracing maneuver warfare as its doctrinal approach towards warfighting, the Army has been flirting

with maneuver warfare since its doctrinal introduction of AirLand Battle in 1982³. While there has been much debate as to whether the Army has embraced maneuver warfare doctrinally or in practice up to this point, there can be no doubt about the Army's position on this issue for the future. Major General Robert Scales, Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, recently stated that "A future enemy is going to focus on land power as his principle strength, as he has in the past...We believe that the secret to future victories is based [on] the need to balance the prodigious killing power of the American military system...with the ability to maneuver, to gain positional advantage...the object is not to kill the enemy in great numbers. The object is to crush him by collapsing his will to resist. The object is psychological and not physical."⁴ The second reason is that there is growing political and public demand within America for quick, decisive and low cost resolution to conflict or war. This efficiency is demanded from a Department of Defense that will continue to downsize. Maneuver warfare provides a more efficient and less costly way to wage war in terms of lost lives and material compared to attrition warfare. The Army and Air Force must turn back the institutional inertia supporting the old American tradition of attrition warfare and instead embrace maneuver.

This monograph will explore the history of the JFACC and the airpower perspectives that have shaped it. It will also examine the theory of maneuver

warfare and the Marine Corps' doctrinal embrace thereof. Finally, it will provide some analysis to show why the two are not compatible.

CHAPTER 1

MANEUVER WARFARE THEORY

While it is not the intent of this monograph to fully develop the theory of maneuver warfare, an examination of some of its general characteristics establish a base from which to assess its compatability with airpower employment through the JFACC.

Maneuver warfare is not a new concept. Principles of maneuver warfare can be found in writings as ancient as Sun Tzu's Art of War. Surprise, deception, the indirect approach, attacking enemy weaknesses, speed, adaptability, and destroying the enemy's will to fight with the least amount of bloodshed are but a few of the principles of war that Sun Tzu offered over 2000 years ago⁵. Today these principles are essential tenets of maneuver warfare. Great military leaders from Ghengis Khan and Napoleon to modern practitioners such as Norman Schwarzkopf have used variations of maneuver warfare to defeat the enemy.

It is generally accepted that there are two styles of warfare- attrition and maneuver warfare.⁶ Over the years many historians and theorists have contributed ideas as to what maneuver warfare is or is not, as well as its overall relevance.

When the meaning of concepts and principles used in maneuver theory are discussed, it is usually done so against the background of attrition warfare because this is what the preponderance of the modern American military establishment is most familiar. This paradigm often leads to further misunderstanding and a distortion of the applicability of maneuver warfare. In an effort to level the playing field, we will examine the characteristics most common to modern day maneuver warfare theory.

First it must be understood that there is not one specific set of rules defining maneuver warfare; essentially there is no cookbook or checklist for how to get it done. However, over the course of the last decade much has been written on the subject and several critical concepts have emerged that have become crucial to the successful conduct of maneuver warfare.

Command and Control

As in all styles of warfare, command and control is a critical function of successful warfighting. There are several key concepts which are part of the philosophy of command and control in maneuver warfare which warrants further discussion.

“Maneuver warfare is an intense competition for time.”⁷ The Boyd Theory best describes the importance of time to the practitioner of maneuver warfare.⁸ In a conflict each combatant begins by observing. He observes himself, the enemy, the terrain, weather, and any other factors bearing on his current situation. As a

result of his observations, the combatant then orients himself by making a mental image of his situation relative to the enemy. On the basis of his orientation he then makes a decision to act. The combatant then acts. It is reasonable to assume that one's decision will cause a change in the situation so that the combatant now goes through the cycle of observation, orientation, decision, and action again. This cycle is known as the "Boyd Cycle" or "OODA Loop". Tremendous advantage is gained for the combatant that can cycle through the OODA loop faster than his opponent. The slower opponent begins to lose the initiative and finds that his reactions to the enemy are increasingly irrelevant. The slower opponent becomes overwhelmed and loses his cohesion or ability to maintain organized resistance. Even if elements of his force continue to fight, they are more easily out-maneuvered and defeated by the quicker opponent. The combatant who cycles through the OODA loop faster than his opponent achieves a victory at lower cost to his forces.⁹

Only a decentralized military can have a fast OODA loop. If command and control are centralized, then observations (information) are fed up the chain of command. Information breeds more information and ultimately a decision for action which is sent back down to the subordinate. The result is the subordinate commander who is maneuver oriented loses the battle for time.¹⁰ As Clausewitz observed "...in war everything is uncertain...all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects...a continuous action of opposites."¹¹ Today, the military's quest for battlefield certainty increases with the technological

improvements that promises to deliver it. Yet history has often demonstrated that the commander who develops organizations and operations that do not require continuous control have been far more successful in battle.¹²

Another concept of maneuver warfare is *Auftragstaktik*, or “mission tactics”.¹³ The commander tells his subordinate commanders what he wants them to accomplish and allows them use of their initiative to figure out how to get it done. The high degree of initiative allowed the subordinate is necessary to maintain a rapid tempo of operations and to stay one step ahead of the enemy. Commander’s intent is a critical component of *Auftragstaktik* and provides a long term, big picture view of what the commander wants in terms of results.¹⁴

“Recon Pull” is a subset of mission tactics. It allows the subordinate commanders to use their initiative to probe for enemy weakness (gaps) along separate routes while avoiding the enemy’s strengths (surfaces). When one subordinate informs his superior of an undefended or lightly defended gap that leads to the enemy’s rear, the rest of the unit is maneuvered to exploit the gap.¹⁵ By operating in this manner, commanders take risks and assume responsibility by giving subordinates adequate freedom. Giving subordinates a high degree of initiative means mistakes are accepted. The zero defect mentality is incompatible with maneuver warfare. Initiative requires trust between commanders and their subordinates, which in turn requires high quality people and realistic, demanding training.

"*Schwerpunkt*" is another German term that means "focus of effort". It is another means to control the activities of subordinates by enabling them to focus all their power toward one purpose. Although a specific unit is designated the focus of effort, *schwerpunkt* is not just a physical focus, it is also a conceptual one which allows subordinate commanders to refer to it along with commander's intent and the mission when making their own decisions. *Schwerpunkt* is "the harmonizing element or medium through which the...intent and mission are realized. It pulls together the efforts of all subordinates and guides them toward the goal, toward the result their commander wants".¹⁶

Finally, commanders must balance the amount of information flow so that they receive only that which they need to monitor the situation. Too much irrelevant information drives decisions which are usually made at levels too far removed from the action by well intentioned staff and commanders. The goal is maximum information with minimum intervention. Allowing the subordinate commanders to fight the battle, the commander intervenes only to exploit opportunities or shift the focus of effort.¹⁷

Physics of War

Both Richard Simpkin in *Race to the Swift*, and Robert Leonhard in *The Art of Maneuver*, have written about the physics of war in the context of maneuver theory. Their purpose is to gain a greater understanding of modern warfare by relating the physics of war with other aspects of maneuver warfare.¹⁸

One of the critical components of maneuver warfare is momentum. Momentum is the product of velocity and mass and "...represents the resistance of a moving body to any change in speed or direction."¹⁹ Mass may be defined as the physical fighting power of a particular unit.²⁰ Mass may be increased by an addition in men or weapons systems. Velocity is expressed as distance over time, not just a measure of speed, it is directional and measured in a straight line.²¹ Momentum can be increased by either enhancing the mass of a unit (increasing its fighting power- men, weapons systems, or equipment) or by increasing its velocity (linear rate of advance to an objective). Therefore, without adding to the mass of a unit, we can "...dramatically improve its operational worth (momentum) by increasing its vectored speed."²²

Acceleration is the rate of change in velocity. A unit on the move may be able to accelerate simply by increasing its vectored speed (velocity). Acceleration is also a measure of how quickly a unit can transition from zero velocity to its maximum velocity. Leonhard uses the example of a tank unit enroute to Objective A at 20 kph. The unit receives orders to turn 120 degrees and attack to seize Objective B. At the moment the unit receives its new mission, its velocity in relation to Objective B is zero. Acceleration is a measure of how fast the unit can turn and reach its maximum velocity toward Objective B.²³

In physics, inertia means that a stationary object remains stationary until acted on by some force. In war the force that causes an object (unit) to move is the commander. In war then, force may be defined as the applied will of the

commander as realized through his staff and subordinate commanders. This is crucial because maneuver warfare theory considers the clash of opposing wills in combat a fundamental perspective of war. Leonhard uses the following formula to quantify "applied will":

$$F1-F2-Fx = E$$

F1 = applied will of the friendly commander (mass x acceleration)

F2 = applied will of the enemy commander

Fx = friction

E = terminal effect upon the enemy²⁴

Means of Defeat

As David Funk points out in his excellent study on dislocation, "[p]recious little has been written concerning the phenomenon of defeat."²⁵ Rather than define defeat, we will note how defeat is perceived- that is defeat seems to be more subjective than objective. Funk sites several studies which demonstrates that defeat usually occurs at a much lower casualty rate than commanders plan for, that "no direct correlation exists between the level of casualties experienced and the decision to admit defeat", and that "tactics" was the most common factor cited for defeat as opposed to high casualty rates.²⁶ These findings would clearly suggest that defeat is likely to occur in the mind of the commander before his forces are physically defeated given the use of proper tactics. This is precisely what maneuver warfare is aimed at- the enemy's will to fight.

Maneuver warfare attempts to defeat the enemy generally through three means- preemption, dislocation, and disruption. Simpkin defines preemption as

the "[implied] use of maneuver to prevent (in the full sense of that word) the outbreak of hostilities."²⁷ It is a departure from peacetime posture which may involve putting a nation on a higher state of readiness or the strategic movement of forces. It is a positive act designed to either force the enemy into military submission or to prevent him from acting on his intentions.²⁸ President John F. Kennedy's actions during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis of increasing the nation's readiness posture and the use of a naval blockade of Cuba is an example of preemption. To successfully preempt, a nation must have highly mobile forces with the capability of presence in time and/or space. Speed in decisions and action are critical. If the opportunity for preemption presents itself at all, the window is usually very short in duration.²⁹ "A victory gained before the situation has crystallized is one the common man does not comprehend...Before he has bloodied his blade the enemy state has already submitted."³⁰

Dislocation utilizes maneuver to render the enemy's strength irrelevant.³¹ Dislocation seeks to fight the enemy on unfair terms. Rather than fight the enemy on his terms the opposing commander will maneuver to set aside the enemy's strengths and give battle on his terms when he is strong and the enemy is weak. We **positionally** dislocate the enemy by either removing him from the decisive point (drawing him out through a feint or by deception) or by removing the decisive point from the enemy (attacking in his rear where he is weak). Either way he must fight us at a point he is not prepared to do so; and on our terms. We **functionally** dislocate the enemy by rendering the enemy's strength,

or a singular function of the enemy's strength irrelevant. Armor on a tank dislocates infantry small arms. Stealth aircraft dislocates enemy air defense systems, and electronic attack dislocates enemy communications capabilities. These effects temporarily render the enemy dysfunctional and allow us to apply our strengths against his weakness. The greatest effects of functional dislocation are realized in the application of combined arms.

The proper application of functional and positional dislocation lead to **moral** dislocation. The speed and shock effect of maneuver leads to confusion in the enemy's mind. His spirit and will to fight are overwhelmed.³²

Disruption deals with attacking an enemy's center of gravity. This sounds simple enough but in fact, there is much confusion in US doctrine concerning centers of gravity and its associated critical vulnerabilities. The significance of centers of gravity to strategy and operations and its relevance to maneuver warfare requires clarification. I concur with the assessments of Dr. Joe Strange in his essay *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clauswitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language*. Strange notes the differing and incorrect interpretations between the services and joint doctrine on the definition of centers of gravity. He argues that the Department of Defense should adopt one definition of center of gravity based on Clausewitz' definition of the term and he correctly establishes the conceptual relationship of critical vulnerabilities to the same.³³

Centers of gravity are not characteristics, capabilities, or locations which might contribute to the effectiveness of a center of gravity as noted by several service and joint doctrinal pubs; nor is it a critical vulnerability as once declared by the Marine Corps.³⁴ Centers of gravity are not “such things as command and control systems, transportation nodes, LOCs, and the like, because they are not capable of functions such as making decisions, directing units, leading people, making demands, raising expectations, or resisting enemy moral or physical forces.”³⁵

An entire dissertation could be dedicated to the exploration of what centers of gravity are and are not. For the purposes of this discussion however, we will say centers of gravity are:

- Sources of moral and physical strength, power, and resistance,
- They are significant entities, relatively few, and should be reduced to one when possible,
- They occur at all levels of war- strategic, operational, and tactical,
- Moral centers of gravity include national and political leaders, populations, and military leaders if they are able to influence action through will and leadership,
- Physical centers of gravity include military organizations, economic and industrial centers, countries and capitals, and power stemming from large populations.³⁶

Critical vulnerabilities are weaknesses which are related to a center of gravity whose exploitation, neutralization, or defeat leads to the defeat of the center gravity in such a manner that the results are disproportional to the resources applied. A critical vulnerability may be readily apparent and subject to exploitation, or it may need to be created. Nevertheless, it is that *thing* which makes the center of gravity vulnerable and by its definition cannot itself be a center of gravity.³⁷ Maneuver warfare seeks to destroy the enemy's will to fight by attacking his centers of gravity through their critical vulnerabilities. "Identification of the enemy's center of gravity and the design of actions which will ultimately expose it to attack and destruction while protecting our own, are the essence of the operational art."³⁸

Clausewitz notes that moral factors "are among the most important in war. They constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole, and at an early stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves and leads the whole mass of force, practically merging with it, since the will itself is a moral quantity. Unfortunately they will not yield to academic wisdom. They cannot be classified or counted. They have to be seen or felt."³⁹ The means of defeat through maneuver warfare targets the will of the enemy. The means of defeat deals more with psychology than mathematics, the enemy mind rather than weapons and fortifications. The means of defeat in maneuver warfare deals with the intangible human factors that cannot be measured or evaluated in a simulation. These

means of defeat however, are the distinguishing factor between maneuver and attrition theory.

Psychology of War

This discussion now places us squarely on the subject of the psychology of war. The maneuverist contends that defeat is a psychological phenomenon rather than a tally of men killed or weapons destroyed. Therefore, a knowledge of psychology and the moral factors of war are critical to the maneuverist position.

Sun Tzu believed that the moral strength and intellectual capacity of man was paramount in war. He advocated actions that would directly target the enemy mind, leaving him isolated, demoralized, and unable to resist. "All warfare is based on deception"⁴⁰ is a crucial component of Sun Tzu's beliefs. The mind of the enemy commander is attacked before battle to confuse and manipulate him in order to, at best, defeat him without battle and, at worst, to set the conditions for a swift and efficient victory.⁴¹

Combined Arms

To maneuver warfare practitioners combined arms is the employment of weapon systems in order to create a synergistic effect while presenting the enemy with a profound dilemma- that is, in order to protect himself from one weapon system he will expose himself to another.⁴²

First we must understand that every weapon system (combat arms) has its weaknesses and its strengths. When we combine combat arms into one organization, we are able to compensate for each arms weaknesses with another arm, hence, the combined arms team. However, it is not enough to form the combined arms team or to proclaim one's self a practitioner of combined arms. Thinking like a combined arms officer requires that we train as one. Both are critical to the practitioner of maneuver warfare. Just as the players on a football team must master their positions and practice the various plays that will bring them victory, so must each combatant master his weapon system and train as a member of a combined arms team to effectively put the enemy on the "horns of a dilemma" in combat. Doing so allows us to strike the enemy psychologically as well as physically which is consistent with maneuver theory.

Finally, we see that maneuver warfare is a battle for time. Commanders strive for a tempo of operations that allow them to stay inside the enemy's decision cycle in order to keep the enemy off balance. This is accomplished by establishing a decentralized command and control system that encourages a high degree of initiative in subordinate commanders. Control is maintained through mission type orders and focus of effort to orient subordinate commanders on what the overall force is to accomplish. Given a certain mass of a combat force, one can increase its velocity in order to increase its momentum thereby increasing the operational worth of that combat force. The commander applies force through his staff and subordinate commanders to effect acceleration and therefore,

momentum, or tempo, in order to apply maneuver against the enemy's mind and his ability to cope with events that are rapidly unfolding before him. Maneuver then becomes "the critical component of warfare because it is the linchpin between the physics of war and the psychology of war."⁴³ The practitioner of maneuver warfare is more concerned with the defeat of the enemy's will to resist than a tally of men and equipment destroyed. Maneuver theory uses deception and avoids set patterns which would render one predictable to the enemy. The maneuverist seeks defeat without battle but understands attrition theory and the complimentary role it will at times have in maneuver warfare. The commander in maneuver warfare understands the value of the combined arms team and the synergistic effect that can be achieved by employing his combined arms team in such a manner that the enemy is constantly faced with a dilemma, thereby degrading his physical and psychological capacity to resist. In maneuver warfare the means of defeat involve maneuver to preempt, dislocate or disrupt the enemy. Maneuver is focused on the enemy's center of gravity through his critical vulnerabilities. If maneuver is not tied to a center of gravity it is irrelevant. The maneuver warfare commander avoids maneuver for the sake of maneuver. Finally, high quality officers and NCOs that are trained to think independently, who understand the nature and history of war, and who have developed a high level of trust in their seniors and subordinates alike, are necessary for the most successful application of maneuver warfare.

CHAPTER 2

THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER

Having established a fundamental understanding of maneuver warfare, the same must be done with the concept of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) in order to ascertain whether or not the two are compatible. At least as important as what the JFACC embodies is how the JFACC doctrinally employs airpower; a doctrine which is driven by a fierce spirit of independence within the Air Force. To understand this we must look briefly at the historical underpinnings of the JFACC concept.⁴⁴

The position of JFACC was first defined in the 1986 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JCS Pub) 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations (for Overseas Land Areas) which represented the culmination of 43 years of effort on the part of the Air Force to codify centralized control of airpower under a functional component commander in joint doctrine.⁴⁵

Ever since the airplane was introduced as another weapon with which to wage war, controversy has thrived between soldiers and airmen over how best to employ airpower. The early airmen, frustrated by the narrow minded, ground oriented soldier, struggled to free himself from the Army's grasp. Brigadier General William M. Mitchell and other air power theorists suggested air power as a means of waging war that only they and other airmen could apparently

appreciate. While other branches of service might have understood what the airpower proponents were advancing, most would never be sold completely on all the promise of airpower. Yet the Air Force, from its early beginnings to the present, has pursued a doctrine of warfighting that has often been in conflict with that of land warfare.

Current Air Force doctrine traces its roots to ideas best articulated by the Italian air power pioneer, Giulio Douhet. The key points of Douhet's theory may be summarized as follows:

1. There is no difference between soldiers and civilians in modern warfare.
2. Offensive land warfare can no longer be waged successfully.
3. Nations cannot defend against an air offensive. The first priority is to command the air. This means taking away the enemy's ability to fly while preserving one's own ability to do so without interference.
4. Nations must be prepared for first strike massive bombing against enemy population and economic and industrial centers in order to shatter the enemy's will to fight.
5. Air warfare will become the dominant form of warfare over land and sea warfare.
6. An independent air force maintained in a state of readiness and capable of operations independent from the army and navy is of primary importance.⁴⁶

Today these same elements of air strategy are reduced to three premises:

1. Airpower can be the decisive instrument of war.
2. The decisive use of airpower requires air superiority first.
3. Achieving air superiority and the overall correct application of airpower necessitates that airpower be centrally controlled.

Billy Mitchell espoused many of Douhet's theories. But while Douhet focused primarily on the strategic use of air power utilizing bombers, Mitchell focused on every possible use of air power to dominate surface warfare. For him, the means to this end was the "centralized coordination of air assets under the control of an autonomous air force command, freed from its dependency on the army".⁴⁷

The independent air force concept was hotly debated within intellectual circles in and outside the military during the interwar years. Mitchell's advocacy of an independent air force was supported by zealots who sponsored bills in Congress for an independent air force with its promise of strategic victory which only hardened the Army's determination to keep its air arm.⁴⁸ The battle for an independent air force in the postwar years became centered on the promise of the success of strategic bombardment. But as Perry McCoy Smith points out in *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945*:

What was of greater concern...was how the AAF could justify its case for autonomy in the immediate postwar period. There were numerous plans..., each based on a different set of specific assumptions, yet all were designed primarily to justify the case for an autonomous Air Force within the national defense structure of the United States...To the AAF leaders, the strategic bombardment mission for years had been both a means and an end. It was a means by which autonomy might be justified and obtained, but it was also considered by the AAF leaders to be the primary purpose of military aviation. The dual technological breakthrough of very-long-range bombers and atomic weapons made

strategic aviation enthusiasts of the past appear quite prophetic to the American public.⁴⁹

Smith goes on to argue that to question the viability of strategic bombardment was to jeopardize the case for the AAF's independence. If strategic bombardment could be proved to be ineffective as the decisive element in warfare then the AAF might be expected to accomplish only air superiority, interdiction, and close air support, none of which could justify complete independence.⁵⁰

Carl Builder in *The Masks of War* provides some interesting insights into the Air Force's concerns over institutional legitimacy and relevancy. Builder defines legitimacy as the confidence of the Air Force in its own rightful independent status, and relevancy as the pertinency of its missions and capabilities. The concern over legitimacy and relevancy is important because they establish the behavior of the Air Force in its approach to strategy, analysis, and military planning. Builder correctly notes the long and hard fought battle by the Air Force for its independence and centralized control of airpower, but asserts the victory was not total. If the Navy and Marines could retain control of its aviation in support of its own surface forces, then why could not the Army retain control of Air Force aviation in support of its surface forces? If the Air Force is not a decisive and independent instrument of war then the reasons for having a separate service to employ airpower are no longer justified.⁵¹

Even though the Air Force has broadened its purview beyond strategic bombardment, particularly in the last half of its forty-year life, to include tactical air warfare, its legitimacy as an independent autonomous institution still rests on the decisive and independent nature of the air war. Support of the ground troops and interdiction of the lines of communication may be the ultimate ends, but the means to those ends

is success in waging the air war; and that is the true business of the Air Force.

At the same time the Air Force is supremely confident about its relevance, about the decisiveness of air power as an instrument of war, whether that instrument is wielded for strategic or tactical objectives. Indeed, the Air Force arguments for its autonomy and legitimacy are rooted in the very same theory that provides its confidence about its relevance and pertinence. With such vital institutional interests vested in a single theory, the institution can no longer question the validity of that theory.⁵²

Finally, Builder advances the belief that the Air Force sees itself as the embodiment of an idea that embraces the independent application of airpower as the decisive instrument of war as its strategy, a strategy driven and sustained by technology. It is through this strategy that the Air Force maintains its independent vision of the application of airpower in warfare. It is through this strategy that the Air force participates in internal and joint planning. Equally important to the merit of the air strategy is its justification of the independence of the Air Force, its mission, and its budget.⁵³

Today we find these cultural threads tightly woven into the concept of JFACC and the joint application of airpower. Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* states that "JFCs will normally designate a JFACC whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC's concept of operations."⁵⁴ Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Command and Control For Joint Air Operations* states that "the JFC will normally designate a JFACC to exploit the capabilities of joint air operations. The JFACC directs this exploitation through a cohesive joint air operations plan (centralized planning) and a responsive and integrated control system (decentralized execution)."⁵⁵

The JFACC responsibilities include planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of joint air operations based on the JFC's concept of operations and air apportionment decision. Specific responsibilities normally include:

1. Developing a joint air operations plan to best support joint force objectives.

2. Recommending to the JFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders.

3. Providing centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of capabilities/forces made available by the JFC.

4. Controlling execution of joint air operations as specified by the JFC, to include making timely adjustments to targeting and tasking of available joint capabilities/forces. If circumstances require the JFACC to change the planned joint air operations during execution, the JFACC will notify the affected component commanders or JFC, as appropriate.

5. Coordinating joint air operations with operations of other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the JFC [e.g., combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations, the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC), and if designated, the joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC) for integration, synchronization, and deconfliction with special operations].

6. Evaluating the results of joint air operations and forwarding combat assessments to the JFC to support the overall combat assessment effort.

7. Performing the duties of the airspace control authority (ACA) and/or area air defense coordinator (AADC) when assigned those responsibilities by the JFC.

8. Functioning as the supported commander for:

- Counterair operations,
- Strategic attack operations, when joint air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity,
- Theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance,
- The JFC's overall air interdiction effort,

9. Functioning as a supporting commander, as directed by the JFC, for operations such as close air support, air interdiction within the land and naval component AOs, and maritime support.⁵⁶

A critical look at these responsibilities is revealing in terms of its focus. First the airpower employment is concentrated on the needs of the JFC. "Planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking...**based on the JFC's concept...develop a joint air...plan to best support force objectives as assigned by the JFC...**" This theme rings throughout the publication, as it should. But to the critical observer, it is obvious that all components support the JFC. The not-so-subtle message is the reluctance to allow airpower to become mired down in support of the surface force's objectives unless directed to do so by the JFC as noted in the last mentioned responsibility of the JFACC- functioning as a

supporting commander for operations such as interdiction and close air support. It is no coincidence that this is the last responsibility mentioned and that the first four are the development of the joint air plan, apportionment recommendations, and the centralized command and control of assigned air assets. This is consistent with the airpower perspective and opens the door to allow maximum influence of Air Force doctrine on joint airpower employment. Air superiority and strategic attack carry the weight of that influence.

The Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course (JDACC), presented at Maxwell Air Force Base, is provided for the training of officers that might serve on a JFACC staff. The JDACC Air Campaign Planning Handbook, in its introduction, states that "This handbook describes a five stage process for developing campaigns from an *air perspective*. This process is the same process described in Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*."⁵⁷ (Emphasis in the original) The handbook emphasizes the importance of matching airpower objectives to national and theater (strategic) level objectives. In reference to John Warden's Strategic Ring Model the handbook states:

In most cases, before surface forces can attack the inner rings, they must penetrate the fielded forces. An Army must defeat the opposing forces before most other vital COGs can be attacked. The same is true for any influence that might be wielded upon the leadership or the population of a country. An airman, however, **can attack any or all of these categories simultaneously or in sequence**, after gaining only the necessary level of air superiority. Airpower can do this *without* defeating the surface forces and is unique in this respect.⁵⁸ (Emphasis in the original)

Clearly the Air Force's strategic theory of airpower employment is not only a means to wage and win wars, but a means to justify the independence and centralized command and control of airpower.

AFDD-1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine* is more to the point. Under a section titled *The Nature of Air and Space Power- A Strategic Perspective*, it states:

Early airpower advocates argued that airpower could be decisive and achieve strategic effects by itself. While this view of airpower was not proved during their lifetimes, **the more recent history of air and space power application, especially post-DESERT STORM, has proven that air and space power does now have the potential to be the dominant and, at times, the decisive element of combat in modern warfare.**⁵⁹ (Emphasis in original)

It then notes that wars have traditionally been fought in three phases: halt the invading force, build up combat power (land forces) and weaken the enemy (culmination), and then mount the decisive counteroffensive. However, the new view of conflict according to the Air Force is:

...the halt phase may be planned as the conflict's decisive phase, not as a precursor necessarily to build up ground forces. The point of the "decisive halt" is to force the enemy beyond their culminating point through the early and sustained overwhelming application of air and space power...The global range, speed, and flexibility of air and space forces bring the "decisive halt" opportunity to reality...Air and space power has become the great enabler that allows all land, sea, and special operations forces to optimize their contributions to America's national security...The US Air Force's assigned mission is to "organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air"- to provide the nation's air and space power- not in support of other tasks as with the air arms of the other Services but as its sole reason for being.⁶⁰ (Emphasis in the original)

In other words, strategic theory is no longer theory, it is reality. The Air Force is the only one that can do it all- alone. Yet the other services, to be effective,

require the aid of the Air Force. The Air Force is clearly comfortable with its legitimacy as an institution. Are they not?

So what does this mean for the Marine commander who desires to keep his air and, indeed, asks for augmentation from the JFACC in support of his maneuver warfare? It means that he must understand the institutional bias toward air power doctrine as it relates to the Air Force's sense of legitimacy and relevancy within the defense establishment. And within that framework convince the airman that he is in fact needed as an integral part of surface maneuver without threatening his sense of identity.

To be fair, there is a great deal of intellectual merit to JFACC and the Air Force's doctrinal vision of airpower employment. The problem lays not with their capability or their stated beliefs on the merit of airpower, it lays with their stubborn quest to validate a theory at the expense of true joint warfare.

As Colonel Edward Mann noted:

The group of planners who met in the basement of the Pentagon under the direction of Colonel John Warden, Air Staff director of war-fighting concepts, during early August 1990 had one clear purpose in mind: to force Iraq's army out of Kuwait by applying airpower in a strategic offensive directed at the sources of Iraqi national power. Their plan would employ "new" concepts- inside-out warfare, simultaneity, and parallel warfare- to apply cataclysmic and unrelenting pressure on the Iraqi nation and Saddam Hussein's regime until the latter acquiesced to the United Nations and coalition demands. Warden and his planners hoped to correct what they felt were America's previous "mistakes" of applying airpower in a gradualistic, supporting role (especially in Vietnam). Airpower would be the "main show" (in some minds, the *only* show), and the Air Force would demonstrate- once and for all- the dominant role that the "military-technical revolution" had made possible for airpower. Indeed, some of the planners hoped to prove that airpower could in fact win a war "all alone."⁶¹

Today this philosophy is alive and well in Air Force doctrine and is reflected in joint air doctrine as well. We must keep this in mind as we strive to seek common ground between the doctrines of airpower and maneuver warfare.

CHAPTER 3

THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

AND MANEUVER WARFARE

Before we establish the compatibility of Marine Corps doctrine with the JFACC, we must look at three things to better understand the Marines' perspective. We will first examine the historical underpinnings of the Marine perspective. As part of that we will try to capture some of the intangibles that play such a large part in the Marines' attitude towards their organization and its place in the joint arena. Then we will look at the Marine's warfighting philosophy, and finally, the employment of its organic aviation within that philosophy.

Marine Corps composition and functions are detailed in 10 U.S.C. 5063, which states in part:

- The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three aircraft wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.

- The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and

for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.⁶²

This code, in part, establishes the legal basis for the Marine Corps' existence and a foundation for its focus on combined arms to include aviation. But there is much more behind the Corps than a statutory declaration. The Corp's role in the nation's defense goes back over 200 years. In spite of the continuous change in the strategic environment, the Corps' role has remained unchanged primarily for three reasons:

- Association with the fleet to meet the nation's worldwide needs for projection of force in peace or war;
- Readiness for expeditionary service; and
- Reliable performance.⁶³

Additionally, in response to the Korean war experience, Congress called on the Marine Corps to fulfill the following special role:

...American history, recent as well as remote, has fully demonstrated the vital need for the existence of a strong force-in-readiness. Such a force, versatile, fast-moving, and hard-hitting,...can prevent the growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt and vigorous action during their incipient stages. The nation's shock troops must be the most ready when the nation is least ready...to provide a balanced force-in-readiness for naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large scale war...⁶⁴

The Corp's naval tradition, its air and ground arm, and its charter make it unique in the nation's defense establishment. But this does not define the culture of the Marine Corps. Reliable performance and being "the most ready when the nation is least ready" is not in and of itself what drives the Corps. What defines

the Corps' spirit is every Marine's commitment to the brotherhood of the Corps. Marines embrace the traditions and legacy of those who have gone before them and strive to build on that legacy for future generations. More than 220 years of blood and valor, tragedy and triumph shine through in that "special esprit de corps that stamps Marines of all ages as a distinct breed apart and fosters the characteristic brash confidence that so irritates fellow warriors of other services- yet remains so essential to the Marines' traditional propensity for close, offensive combat."⁶⁵ Marines believe in their Corps. Every Marine a rifleman first. It does not matter if you fly, gun a tank, drive a truck, or process intelligence, more important than anything else is the privilege to be called "Marine". As Brigadier General Carl Mundy stated: "Its not the stars or bars you have, not what you wear on your sleeve or shoulder, that determines what you are. Its what you wear on your collar- the eagle, globe, and anchor- that puts you in the Brotherhood of the Marines."⁶⁶ It is inconceivable for a Marine to let another Marine down, whether in the air or on the ground. Major General Mike Myatt, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division in Desert Storm recalled an episode during that war:

During one of our night combined arms raids, I heard over our radio the voice of the (forward air controller) pilot telling the "Wolfpack" pilots: "Hurry up! They are attacking our Marines!" as he watched muzzle flashes of the Iraqi artillery firing at our ground raid force. That was one of the most poignant moments of my life. I never take the air-ground team for granted...but the result is a marvelous marriage, more powerful than the sum of its parts, where a Marine's most sought after privilege is to be able to fight for another Marine.⁶⁷

To the casual observer, these quotes mean little. However, every Marine who reads them gets a chill down his spine and a lump in his throat as he nods in

silent affirmation to himself. All this is hard for many outsiders to understand, and for even more to accept. But accept they must, for this is what drives the Marines. Honor, courage, commitment. Commitment to each other and to excellence. This is their culture. It is this culture which is responsible for the Corps' reliable performance- yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

The Marine Corps has always enjoyed a reputation with Congress for its competency within its well defined, if limited, role. While the Army, Navy, and Air Force fight over national military strategy and the liberal socialization of its Services, the Marine Corps continues to focus on two things: Making Marines, and winning the nations battles.⁶⁸ The Marine Corps provides these services at a fraction of the cost of the national defense budget. Doing more with less has always been a way of life for the Corps, which has driven a spirit of innovation and adaptability. The Marines have taken more pride in who they are than what they own. With less infantry, tanks, artillery, aircraft, and other assets, the Marines have always looked for ways to get the biggest "bang for their buck." This, as well as the Corps' culture and legislative mandate are, in part, the reasons for the Marines' expert development of the combined arms team for combat.

In 1989 the Marine Corps officially embraced maneuver warfare as its warfighting philosophy with the publication of FMFM-1, *Warfighting*.⁶⁹ With the Corps' emphasis on leadership, discipline, professionalism, combined arms, the study of the moral factors in war, and their trust in each other, maneuver warfare

seemed like a natural fit. Another reason for embracing maneuver warfare is the Marine Corps' realization that they would almost always fight out-manned or out-gunned with their limited resources, and maneuver provided another way to achieve a quick victory more efficiently.

Whereas Marines had, up until this time, focused more on tactical warfare, maneuver warfare opened the door more to the prospect of war at the operational level. Informal intellectual debate within and without the Corps' on the merits of operational maneuver was finally formalized with the publication of *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* by the Concepts Division of Marine Corps Combat Development Command in January 1996.

The Marine Corps defines maneuver warfare as "...a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope."⁷⁰ The Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy embraces most of the principles discussed in Chapter 1. The following more specifically summarizes some of the principles of the Marine Corps' philosophy on the conduct of war as discussed in MCDP-1, *Warfighting*.

Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed, and speed over time, or tempo, to seize and maintain the initiative to keep the enemy off balance. Also important is the need to focus the efforts of a combat force to exploit decisive opportunities as they arise. Surprise and deception are considered weapons critical to successful operations.

Decentralized command and control is a vital component. The philosophy of command emphasizes the human dimension over technology and seeks to exploit traits such as boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, and imagination. As a phenomenon, war is disorderly and uncertain; commanders must not seek certainty lest they lose the initiative to the enemy. Perhaps most important, the Marine Corps' command philosophy demands competent leadership at all levels of command to foster confidence among seniors and subordinates.

Since the goal is not the cumulative attrition of enemy strength, the Marine Corps looks to a larger scheme for how to achieve victory. The Marine Corps seeks to defeat the enemy by targeting his center of gravity or gravities. Rather than attack the center of gravity directly, they attack the critical vulnerabilities associated with the center of gravity, causing its collapse. After deciding how they intend to win, the Marines attempt to shape the general conditions for war. Shaping consists of lethal and nonlethal actions that span the spectrum from direct attack to psychological operations, from electronic warfare to the stockpiling of critical supplies for future operations. Shaping may render the enemy vulnerable to attack, facilitate friendly maneuver, and dictate the time and place for decisive battle.

Since war is a conflict of opposing wills, decisions cannot be made in a vacuum. Decisions must be made considering the enemy's anticipated actions and reactions. Time is a critical factor in decisionmaking- often the most

important factor. Decisionmaking may be intuitive or analytical depending on the situation and the commander's personality. Decisions should be based on awareness rather than mechanical habit. Do not seek the perfect solution in an uncertain environment. The perfect solution does not exist. As General George Patton said: "A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week."⁷¹

Mission tactics are key to the Marine Corps' philosophy of war. Commander's intent, and the designation of a main effort provide unity and focus to the various efforts. Recon pull is utilized to discover and exploit gaps in the enemy's positions. Mission tactics require a high level of trust between seniors and subordinates.

In order to maximize combat power, the Marine Corps follows a doctrine of combined arms which allows them to take best advantage of all their available resources. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. This dilemma results in a no-win situation.

In the Marine Corps, maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in and about war. It is a philosophy born of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state of mind bent on shattering the enemy morally and physically by attacking his weaknesses and avoiding his strengths. In short, they believe it is a philosophy for fighting smart.⁷²

To fill its unique roll in the nation's defense, the Marine Corps organizes its forces for employment by integrating four functional elements: ground combat, air combat, combat service support, and command and control into one cohesive, tasked organized unit called the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MAGTF is the Marine Corps' primary tactical organization for all missions across the range of military operations. The MAGTF provides a Combatant Commander or other operational commander with a versatile expeditionary force for responding to a broad range of crisis and conflict situations. MAGTFs are balanced, highly trained, and integrated combat arms teams.

The primary mission of the Marine Corps' aviation is to participate as the supporting air component of the Fleet Marine Forces in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and conducting such land operations as may be essential for the prosecution of a naval campaign. Since the primary mission is support of combat operations, Marine Corps doctrine envisions that Marine Corps aviation will support the landing forces throughout an assault landing and subsequent operations.⁷³

Marine aviation is trained to accomplish six functions:

1. Offensive air support (OAS), which includes close air support (CAS) and deep air support (DAS).
2. Antiair warfare (AAW), which includes offensive AAW (OAAW) and air defense.

3. Assault support.
4. Air reconnaissance.
5. Electronic warfare.
6. Control of aircraft and missiles.⁷⁴

Marines train their officers how not only to employ their particular aircraft or support function, but how to integrate the entire six functions of Marine aviation into the combined arms effort of the MAGTF commander. If the MAGTF commander has a strategic mission, his aviation has been trained to support it. If the MAGTF commander has an operational mission, his aviation has been trained to support it; and if he is tactical then Marine air can support that also. Anyone who has tried to integrate aviation, artillery, and maneuver forces into a combined arms action knows how difficult it is to accomplish safely and effectively. Marines train to the combined arms standard every day- tactical and operational- with their fellow earth-bound Marines. Even in football, a team sport, you cannot skip all practices and show up on game day and say you want to be a part of the team. You do not understand the plays, the timing, the risks. You lack the experience to be intuitive in responding to the situation and the coach's intent. There is no bond, no trust, no credibility. This is even more important in war.

Marines who fly planes are no different from other Marines. They just have different weapon systems. But they all share the same perspective, same

spirit, same right of passage, and they work for the same guy every other Marine does- the MAGTF commander.

In conclusion, we see that the Marines are a historical organization steeped in tradition and secure in their role in the nation's defense. Marines take pride in who they are more than anything else. They know the importance of the Marine air-ground team and are reluctant to break it up, not because they have trained so hard together to get it right, but because they want the privilege to fight for each other. Marines are anxious to work with others, they just prefer to do it as a team- a combined arms team- indoctrinated in, and trained to think maneuver warfare.

CHAPTER 4

MARINE MANEUVER AND JFACC:

MILK AND HONEY, OR OIL AND WATER?

With the stage set to decide the compatibility of Marine Corps maneuver warfare with the JFACC doctrine, a proper determination can be made. We have not explored every aspect of either doctrine, rather, we have looked only at those issues which will help us determine where and if the two doctrines can find common ground. We have also tried to understand the personalities of the two Services behind the doctrine and the reasons they view matters as they do in order to help us gain insight into why the problem is so difficult.

If we simply ask ourselves, from an abstract point of view, if the Air Force is capable of participating in maneuver warfare, the answer is absolutely. They have the intellect and the weapon systems to do so. If we ask ourselves *will* the Air Force participate in maneuver warfare, then the answer is probably not, given its disposition towards independent operations and the supremacy of airpower- in its "proper" application.

Marines are focused on the Corps. They value the institution much more than its toys. The Marine Corps and its culture are a distinct way of life. Marines want to look after each other, to fight for each other. Marines ask themselves what they can do to fit into the Marine Corps combined arms team.

This attitude is institutionally extended to the joint arena. Marines are not concerned with saving the world, or defeating it single handedly. They understand their role in life and are secure in their legitimacy and relevancy as an institution.

"The Air Force identifies itself with flying and things that fly; the institution is secondary, it is a means to those things."⁷⁵ They are focused more on what they do than who they are. The Air Force sees itself as "the keeper and wielder of the decisive instruments of war...[and] is about ensuring the independence of those who fly and launch these machines to have and use them for what they are- the ultimate means for both the freedom of flight and the destruction of war."⁷⁶ The Air Force is not secure in its institutional relevancy and legitimacy, and, therefore, has pursued a strategy which in addition to supporting its internal planning, justifies the independence of its missions, forces, and the institution itself.

All of this has had its impact in the joint arena and its doctrine. Whereas the Marine Corps may influence relatively small sections of joint doctrine (i.e., close air support or amphibious joint doctrine), the Air Force influences a major part of the joint fight through its sponsorship of joint air doctrine, joint air command and control, and space applications.

Only airmen can understand, and take advantage of, the third dimension and its application in warfare.⁷⁷ The early and sustained application of air and space power with its enormous complexity of targets, resources, timing, and

coordination serves to freeze in the concepts of central control and decisive use, while freezing out those who would meddle with either.⁷⁸ Airpower must be able to wage and win wars independent of surface forces because that is what airpower theory says an independent Air Force can do.

One needs to only look at a couple of principles of maneuver warfare to see that it is not compatible with the JFACC. We begin with the philosophy of command and control since this is perhaps the most controversial and touches on several related issues. The fundamental philosophies of the Air Force and the Marine Corps differ. In the Air Force the air battle comes first and is separate from surface maneuver. The Air Force emphasizes the organization of all aviation assets under the centralized command of the JFACC as the key to victory. The Marine Corps maintains aviation is a piece of the total force, a supporting element of the overall campaign or operation. What does joint doctrine say? Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Command and Control of Joint Air Operations* has this to say:

Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available forces. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat. The JFC may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces, as in the policy for C2 of USMC TACAIR during sustained operations ashore...The JFC normally designates a JFACC to integrate and exploit the joint airpower capabilities of different nations, Services, and components.⁷⁹

If you are the Air Force, you probably read that you should control *all* joint air assets but may have to settle for less. If you are a Marine, you probably read that you should keep your own air as an integral part of the MAGTF but may have to give some up to the JFACC. Who is right? The answer is perhaps they both are, depending on the phase of the campaign and the JFC's guidance. Theoretically however, Marines could be committed to battle without its own organic air. Now the Marine commander who is trying to control his own tempo in order to stay inside the enemy's decision cycle while pressing his critical vulnerability must go to the JFACC and ask for his support. Remember, the reason the JFACC has control of the Marine air is because he is prosecuting his own air war **separate** from the surface maneuver. The Marine commander cannot wait for an ATO which is at least 24 hours away; and he is concerned about the promise of diverts from other missions he has no control over. If and when the aircraft show up, the chance to exploit an opportunity may have already passed. If the commander does not use the aircraft, he will surely lose them because he does not control them. Tempo is adversely affected, the Marines lose an opportunity and the initiative.

The Marine organization hinges its success on operations which *do not* require continuous control (consistent with maneuver warfare theory), and is therefore, not compatible with the JFACC's organization which *does* require continuous control. Is the centralized control of joint air necessary to help the

Marine commander when he really needs it, or is it necessary for the Air Force's never ending quest to validate their theory of airpower employment?

Combined arms is critical to the Marines' maneuver warfare. Here again we have a problem with the JFACC. The Air Force position which has been stated repeatedly, is represented by Carl Pivarsky: "the close fight (the core competency of the surface force) is becoming less important than the interdiction fight. In theory, a perfectly executed interdiction effort would obviate the need for close combat or maneuver."⁸⁰ No maneuver, no close fight, no need for combined arms. Yet this completely negates the history and nature of war for the promise of technology and a theory.

Any highly mobile, combined arms team engaged on a dynamic, fast changing, modern battlefield knows the value of high quality, integrated combined arms training. The Air Force believes, in the name of centralized control, that an aircraft from any service or nation could meet the Marines' air support needs.⁸¹ Imagine the offensive backfield of the Denver Broncos. They are a highly trained, integrated offensive backfield. Each man knows the other, they trust each other implicitly, and each knows intuitively how to adjust to defensive changes that occur during the game. This bond and cohesiveness is present because of the long hours spent training together and the hardships shared. Right before the Superbowl, the starting quarterback is replaced by a quarterback from the NFC. He has been trained on the wishbone offense. Denver runs the pro formation. They lose. It would not work in any organized

sport but the Air Force believes it would work in war where the problem is much more complex, the stakes much higher. For all the talk of developing a joint air doctrine that exploits the capabilities of the whole team, we seem to forget that words do not make an effective fighting force. Training does. Any style of warfare demands that.

CONCLUSION

The Marine Corps embraces maneuver warfare as its warfighting philosophy. The Air Force embraces a theory of airpower employment which emphasizes strategic attack and interdiction on a national and theater level. The JFACC concept establishes, in joint doctrine, the opportunity for the Air Force to pursue that theory. The Air Force believes only they are operationally and strategically oriented and that the Marines are only capable of seeing tactically.⁸² The Air Force believes that if they are allowed to employ airpower in concert with their doctrine that, theoretically, maneuver and the close fight will not be required. The Marines take the side of history and therefore, they prepare for war at its most intimate level- that of the infantryman.

The Marines have repeatedly validated themselves as an institution. The Air Force has too, but they do not seem to be secure in that fact. The greatest Air Force in the world has and will continue to do great things for our nation. However, as long as the Air Force continues to pursue the supremacy of airpower as the dominant factor in war, as long as they continue to insist on the superiority of their doctrine over others, there is no chance of JFACC being compatible with the Marine Corps maneuver warfare philosophy.

Anything that could not be reached by the meager wisdom of such one- sided points of view was held to be beyond scientific control: it lay in the realm of genius, which rises above all rules.

Pity the soldier who is supposed to crawl among these scraps of rules, not good enough for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh at...Pity the theory that conflicts with reason!⁸³

ENDNOTES

¹ There are ongoing debates throughout the Department of Defense and in the professional journals of the Services on these matters.

² This is an argument advanced by the Air Force that I have encountered in my personal discussions on this issue. This functional use of aviation in general is discussed frequently in the professional journals of the Services.

³ Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver (Novato: Presidio Press, 1991) 165.

⁴ Gerry J. Gilmore, "Avoiding Attrition Warfare in 2020-2025," Army News Service, 28 July 1997, 1-4.

⁵ Sun Tzu, Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) 9.

⁶ Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 4.

⁷ Ibid. 82.

⁸ William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 4-7. John Boyd is a retired Air Force Colonel and fighter pilot who developed the "Boyd Cycle" from his study of fighter engagements between US and North Korean aircraft during the Korean War to explain why more capable MIG fighters were so overwhelmingly defeated by the less capable F-86. Boyd's complete thesis is contained in a lecture entitled "Patterns of Conflict", which he delivered in May 1978.

⁹ Ibid, 7.

¹⁰ Ibid. 6.

¹¹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed., trans. Michael Howard and Peter Peret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 136.

¹² Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 264-267.

¹³ Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 91. Simpkin in Race to the Swift, 12, interprets the term as "directive control". The meaning however is the same as "mission tactics".

¹⁴ Ibid. 13.

¹⁵ Leonhard, Art of Maneuver, 114.

¹⁶ Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 18.

¹⁷ Ibid. 22.

¹⁸ Leonhard, Art of Maneuver, 80.

¹⁹ Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), 95.

²⁰ Ibid. 81.

²¹ Leonhard, Art of Maneuver, 82.

²² Ibid. 84.

²³ Ibid. 83-84.

²⁴ Ibid. 83-86.

²⁵ Dave Funk, "Tactical Dislocation: Force XXI Doctrine or Just Another Pretty Theory?," School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College (First Term AY 97-98), 34.

²⁶ Ibid. 34-37.

²⁷ Simpkin, Race to the Swift, 140.

²⁸ Ibid. 141.

²⁹ Leonhard, Art of Maneuver, 62-66.

³⁰ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, .87.

³¹ Leonhard, Art of Maneuver, 66. Other writers on maneuver warfare, including Leonard in his subsequent writings, note that dislocation encompasses both preemption and disruption as the primary means of defeat.

³² For an excellent discussion on dislocation see David Funk, "Tactical Dislocation: Force XXI Doctrine or Just Another Pretty Theory", 23-32, and Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 61-73.

³³ Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language (Quantico: Command and Staff College Foundation, 1996),4.

³⁴ Ibid. 1. In his essay, Dr. Strange cites Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, p III-20, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, p 63, FM 100-5 Operations, HQ Department of the Army, June 1993, p 6-7, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 - Naval Warfare, 28 March 1994, p 72 to support his argument on center of gravity definitions of these respective services. FMFM 1 Warfighting (Washington DC: Dept of the Navy, HQUSMC, 6 March 1989, footnote 28, p 85, is cited for its incorrect assessment that centers of gravity are critical vulnerabilities. Robert Leonhard in Art of Maneuver, p 20-24, also asserts that centers of gravity are critical vulnerabilities and not a source of strength.

³⁵ Ibid. 25.

³⁶ Ibid. 5-26. Dr. Strange presents an excellent historical analysis of centers of gravity at all levels of war throughout his entire essay.

³⁷ Ibid. 75-76.

³⁸ US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1986), 179-180.

³⁹ Clausewitz, On War, 184.

⁴⁰ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 66.

⁴¹ Ibid. 39-44.

⁴² Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, 20.

⁴³ Leonhard, *Art of Maneuver*, 88.

⁴⁴ The JFACC doctrine has been influenced primarily by the Air Force. The Air Force, like all services, is motivated by issues which are rooted in its history.

⁴⁵ Stephen J. McNamara, *Airpower's Gordian Knot: Centralized Versus Organic Control* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1994), 1. JCS Pub 26 has been redesignated Joint Pub 3-01.2, *Joint Doctrine For Theater Counterair Operations*.

⁴⁶ Giulio Douhet, *Command of the Air*, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), 3-69.

⁴⁷ David MacIsaac, "Voices From the Blue: The Air Power Theorists," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Peret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 631.

⁴⁸ I. B. Holley Jr., "Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory," in *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*, ed. Philip S. Meilinger (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1997), 587.

⁴⁹ Perry McCoy Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970) 14-17.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 30-31. Precision bombing has replaced the atomic weapon as the centerpiece of strategic attack in airpower doctrine.

⁵¹ Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) 27-28.

⁵² Ibid. 28.

⁵³ Ibid. 32-33.

⁵⁴ US Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1995), II-15.

⁵⁵ US Joint Publication 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1994), I-2.

⁵⁶ Ibid. II-2 - 3.

⁵⁷ Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course, *Air Campaign Planning Handbook* (January 1997), I.

⁵⁸ Ibid. 30-31.

⁵⁹ US Air Force Doctrine Document 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 40-41.

⁶⁰ Ibid. 42-44.

⁶¹ Edward C. Mann, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1995), 1-2.

⁶² United States Codes, 1988, Vol. III, Title 10, 5063, United States Marine Corps: composition: functions.

⁶³ Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991), 1.

⁶⁴ Charles C. Krulak, "The United States Marine Corps: Our Nation's Force-in-Readiness for the 21st Century," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1998, 16.

⁶⁵ Joseph H. Alexander, A Fellowship of Valor: The Battle History of the United States Marines (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), xv.

⁶⁶ This quote is attributed to then Brigadier General Carl Mundy, USMC, on the Marine Corps Birthday 1984.

⁶⁷ Alexander, A Fellowship of Valor, 369.

⁶⁸ Ibid. xv.

⁶⁹ FMFM-1, Warfighting, 1989.

⁷⁰ Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1, Warfighting (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 73.

⁷¹ George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), 354.

⁷² See MCDP-1, Warfighting, Chapter 4, "The Conduct of War", for a more detailed discussion on the Marines' warfighting philosophy.

⁷³ Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 1-11, Fleet Marine Force Organization (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1992), 5-1.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Builder, Masks of War, 37.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 33.

⁷⁷ AFDD-1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 42.

⁷⁸ Builder, Masks of War, 137. Builder was referring to the Air Force's old Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). This plan utilized nuclear weapons in an all out maximum effort offensive war, which would be decisive, and which justified the Air Force's institutional independence and its concepts of war. Today we replace nuclear with precision attack and the statement remains valid.

⁷⁹ Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control of Air Operations. Also, Joint Pub 3-0 states "...Joint Force Commanders should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the Joint Force Commander, while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations."

⁸⁰ Carl R. Pivarsky Jr., Airpower in the Context of a Dysfunctional Joint Doctrine, (Air War College, February 1997) 12.

⁸¹ This assertion has been made repeatedly. The JFACC would determine the needs of the surface forces and provide air sorties from based on their availability.

⁸² Pivarsky, Airpower in the Context of a Dysfunctional Doctrine, 22. Pivarsky uses the Army in his example. The Marine Corps is inferred because it also is a maneuver unit.

⁸³ Clausewitz, On War, 136.

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